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Rhode Island’s Prescription Drug 
Database: Warrantless Searches by 
Law Enforcement Pass Constitutional 
Muster 
 
Stephen D. Lapatin* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The opioid epidemic in Rhode Island is the most urgent public 
health crisis of our generation.1 The opioid crisis originated in the 
late 1990s when pharmaceutical companies assured doctors that 
their patients would not become addicted to prescription opioids.2 
 
* Candidate for Juris Doctor,  Roger  Williams  University  School  of 
Law, 2019. Thank you to Professor Colleen P. Murphy, Nicole Rohr, Tyler 
Bischoff and the Roger Williams University Law Review Editorial Board for 
their invaluable guidance throughout the writing process. 
1. Overdose Prevention and Intervention Task Force, R.I. OFF. 
GOVERNOR, http://www.governor.ri.gov/initiatives/odtaskforce/ (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2018). 
2. Opioid Overdose Crisis, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis (last 
updated Mar. 2018); Opioid Overdose: Prescribing Data, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/ 
prescribing.html (last updated Aug. 30, 2017); Rhode Island’s Strategic Plan 
on Addiction and Overdose: Four Strategies to Alter the Course of an 
Epidemic, R.I. GOVERNOR’S OVERDOSE PREVENTION & INTERVENTION TASK 
FORCE 3 (2015), health.ri.gov/news/temp/RhodeIslandsStrategicPlan 
OnAddictionAndOverdose.pdf. (“The two main driving forces behind this 
increase were regulatory pressures encouraging more opioid prescribing, and 
unscrupulous practices by some in the pharmaceutical industry.”). 
Nationwide, a total of 214,881,622 opioid prescriptions were dispensed by 
retail pharmacies in 2016. CDC, Annual Surveillance Report of Drug-Related 
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Consequently, opioid prescribing rates increased dramatically, 
resulting in widespread diversion and misuse.3 
Despite state-wide efforts to combat the opioid epidemic, 
opioid addiction continues to tighten its grip on Rhode Islanders.4 
In 2014, Rhode Island established a prescription drug monitoring 
database (PDMP), which contains prescription information for 
every Schedule II–V drug that is prescribed.5 Rhode Island’s 
PDMP has proven to be an important mechanism in the fight 
against the opioid crisis, as it “helps to prevent over-prescribing 
and promotes better coordination among healthcare providers 
throughout the state.”6 Additionally, the PDMP is a tool for law 
enforcement to detect overprescribing, diversion, or fraud related 
to prescription opioids.7 Under the 2014 PDMP law, law 
enforcement officials were required to obtain a warrant pursuant 
to probable cause in order to access PDMP  information.8  
However, the warrant requirement was repealed in 2017, making 
it easier for law enforcement to access PDMP information.9 
 
report.pdf. 
3. Opioid Overdose Crisis, supra note 2. A study conducted by the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention found that in about a quarter of 
all United States counties, enough opioids were prescribed in 2016 for every 
person to have one. U.S. Prescribing Rate Maps, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
& PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/maps/rxrate-maps.html 
(last updated July 31, 2017). 
4. Overdose Death Data, PREVENT OVERDOSE RI, 
http://preventoverdoseri.org/overdose-deaths/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2018) 
[hereinafter Overdose Death Data]. From 2011 to 2016, overdose deaths 
increased by more than ninety percent in Rhode Island. Id. 
5. See 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-3.32 (Supp. 2017). Most states have 
implemented various forms of PDMPs, which monitor the prescribing and 
dispensing of Schedule II–V controlled substances to prevent improper or 
illegal use of controlled substances. What States Need to Know about PDMPs, 
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/ 
drugoverdose/pdmp/states.html (last updated Oct. 3, 2017). 
6. Press Release, R.I. Dep’t of Health, RI Achieves 100% Enrollment in 
Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (Sept. 29, 2016), 
http://www.ri.gov/press/view/28654 (quoting current Rhode Island State 
Governor Gina M. Raimondo). The PDMP serves to “identify unusual or 
aberrant patterns of prescribing controlled substances, by relevant 
prescribing attributes.” 21 § 21-28-3.32(n)(3)(ii). 
7. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, Mission, R.I. DEP’T HEALTH, 
http://health.ri.gov/programs/detail.php?pgm_id=156/ (last visited Mar. 22, 
2018) [hereinafter Prescription Drug Monitoring Program]. 
8. § 21-28-3.32(a)(4). See H.B. 7574, 2014 Leg., Jan Sess. (R.I. 2014). 
9. § 21-28-3.32(a)(5). Compare H.B. 7574, 2014 Leg., Jan Sess. (R.I. 
 528  ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 23:526 
 
Effective January 1, 2018, the 2017 Rhode Island law 
authorizes law enforcement officials within the Medicaid Fraud 
and Patient Abuse Unit (MFPAU) in the Office of the Rhode 
Island Attorney General (RIAG) to access PDMP information 
without a warrant.10 While this is the current law, there will 
likely be constitutional challenges, as previewed during the 
legislative process in 2017 when the Rhode Island General 
Assembly considered the elimination of the warrant 
requirement.11 At that time, the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) and over twenty medical associations strongly opposed  
the bill.12 During the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on the 
then-proposed law, a representative testifying on behalf of various 
medical associations in Rhode Island argued that a warrantless 
search of the PDMP is unconstitutional and a gross invasion of 
privacy rights.13  Moreover, the ACLU stated, “[i]f police wanted  
to search the medicine cabinet in your home, they would need a 
warrant,” and “[t]he fact that the medicine cabinet is stored 
electronically shouldn’t change that equation.”14 On the other 
hand, the RIAG strongly advocated in favor of the proposed law, 
arguing that the law is not only constitutional, but also necessary 
because the warrant requirement under the 2014 law significantly 
hampered   investigations   into   “pill-mills”   and over-prescribing 
 
 
2014) (requiring a warrant for all law enforcement) with H.B. 5469, 2017 
Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2017) (requiring no warrant for “a department employee 
to a certified law enforcement prescription drug diversion investigator of a 
qualified law enforcement agency for use in an investigation”). 
10. § 21-28-3.32(a)(5). 
11. Organizations Ask Governor to Veto Bill Allowing Law Enforcement 
Access  to PDMP Without Warrant, ACLU (July 17, 2017), 
http://www.riaclu.org/news/post/organizations-ask-governor-to-veto-bill- 
allowing-law-enformcement-access-to. 
12. Id. Medical associations that were opposed to warrantless searches 
of the PDMP included, among others, the Rhode Island Medical Society, the 
Hospital Association of Rhode Island, the Mental Health Association of Rhode 
Island, the Rhode Island Academy of Physician Assistants, and the Rhode 
Island Health Center Association. Opposed to Warrantless Search of 
Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, R.I. MED. SOC’Y, http://riaclu.org/ 
images/uploads/PDMP_Supporting_Groups.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2018). 
13. An Act Relating to Food and Drugs — Uniform Controlled 
Substances Act: Hearing on S. 656 Before the S. Comm. on Jud., 2017 Leg., 
Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2017). 
14. Organizations Ask Governor to Veto Bill Allowing Law Enforcement 
Access to PDMP Without Warrant, supra note 11. 
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physicians.15 Likewise, Governor Gina Raimondo described the 
law as one more “tool in the toolbox against the criminal networks 
that prey on Rhode Islanders who have become addicted to 
prescription drugs.”16 Ultimately, the Rhode Island General 
Assembly agreed with Governor Raimondo and the RIAG, 
repealing the warrant requirement before law enforcement can 
access PDMP information.17 
It is well-settled that under the Fourth Amendment, “a 
warrant is required––subject to well-delineated exceptions––for 
any government intrusion into an area in which an individual 
retains a reasonable expectation of privacy.”18 In light of this 
privacy concern, the 2017 Rhode Island law was one of the most 
highly contested pieces of legislation in the 2017 legislative 
session. Beyond Rhode Island, Fourth Amendment challenges to 
laws authorizing warrantless searches of state-PDMPs have 
begun to emerge throughout the country.19 The ACLU challenged 
laws similar to that of Rhode Island in Utah and Oregon; it has 
taken cases as high as the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit.20 However, the constitutionality of laws permitting 
warrantless searches of PDMPs remains largely unsettled across 
all jurisdictions. 
This Comment will examine the constitutionality of the 2017 
Rhode Island law from the perspective of patients and medical 
personnel in the context of the warrant requirement under the 
 
 
15. An Act Relating to Food and Drugs — Uniform Controlled 
Substances Act: Hearing on S. 656 Before the S. Comm. on Jud., 2017 Leg., 
Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2017) (statement of Matthew Lenz, R.I. Att’y Gen.). 
16. See Katherine Gregg, Raimondo Signs Bill Allowing Warrantless 
Searches of R.I. Drug Database, PROVIDENCE J. (July 19, 2017, 7:12 PM), 
http://www.providencejournal.com/news/20170719/raimondo-signs-bill- 
allowing-warrantless-searches-of-ri-drug-database. 
17. See 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-3.32(a)(5) (Supp. 2017). 
18. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009). 
19. See Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. ACLU, 860 F.3d 
1228 (9th Cir. 2017); United States D.O.J. v. Utah Dep’t of Com., No. 2:16- 
CV-611-DN-DBP, 2017 WL 3189868, at *1 (D. Utah Jul. 27, 2017). 
20. See Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, 860 F.3d at 1228, 
1231 (“The ACLU . . . argu[ed] that the DEA’s use of subpoenas violate[d] 
their Fourth Amendment rights. They sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief prohibiting the DEA from obtaining prescription records from the 
PDMP without a warrant supported by probable cause.”); Utah Dep’t of Com., 
WL 3189868, at *1. 
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Fourth Amendment. This Comment will argue that the law does 
not violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. Part I will begin by discussing Rhode Island’s  
PDMP law prior to 2017 and proceed to examine the legislature’s 
fight against the opioid epidemic that led to the 2017 law 
authorizing law enforcement to access the PDMP without a 
warrant. Part II will address constitutional issues pertaining to 
the 2017 law, beginning by analyzing the constitutionality of the 
law from the perspective of patients and will examine whether 
they retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
prescription information contained in the PDMP. In addition, this 
Part will examine the constitutionality of the law from the 
perspective of medical personnel and its applicability to the 
warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment. Finally, this 
Part will conclude that the 2017 law is constitutional because 
patients do not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
prescription information and searching a prescribing medical 
professional’s prescription records is an administrative search, 
which is an exception to the warrant requirement. 
I. RHODE ISLAND’S LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO ITS OPIOID CRISIS 
The 2017 Rhode Island law discarded the warrant 
requirement contained in the PDMP law for certain law 
enforcement officials.21 Since creating the PDMP in 2014, the 
Rhode Island General Assembly has passed numerous laws aimed 
at combatting the opioid crisis.22 Despite those efforts, it is  
evident the legislature remains concerned about the state of the 
opioid crisis in Rhode Island, as illustrated by the enactment of 
the 2017 Rhode Island law. This part will examine the PDMP law 
prior to 2017 and the changes implemented through the 
enactment of the 2017 Rhode Island law. 
A. Rhode Island Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Prior to 
2017 
In 2014, Rhode Island created a statewide PDMP maintained 
 
21. § 21-28-3.32(a)(5). 
22. See, e.g., H.B. 7574, 2014 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2014); S.B. 2523, 2014 
Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2014); S.B. 2823 (R.I. 2016); S.B. 2946, 2016 Leg., Jan. 
Sess. (R.I. 2016); H.R. 5469, 2017 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2017). 
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by the Rhode Island Department of Health (RIDOH).23 The  
PDMP collects, monitors, and analyzes electronically transmitted 
prescribing and dispensing data submitted by medical 
practitioners and pharmacies.24 All licensed physicians and 
pharmacists are required to register with the PDMP and report to 
the database every Schedule II–V prescription that they issue 
within one business day.25 
Since 2016, Rhode Island has required prescribing physicians 
and pharmacists to review the PDMP prior to prescribing or 
dispensing opioids to protect against patients seeking 
prescriptions for illegitimate medical reasons.26 Studies have 
shown that this requirement has been effective in combatting the 
opioid crisis.27 For example, a 2010 study found that when the 
PDMP was reviewed prior to issuing a prescription, emergency 
room physicians altered their patient’s opioid prescriptions in 
forty-one percent of cases.28 Moreover, sixty-one percent of 
patients received fewer opioid pain medications than had been 
previously planned by the physicians prior to reviewing the 
PDMP, with the physician sometimes choosing not to prescribe an 
opioid at all.29 
Information reported to the PDMP includes basic information, 
such as the patient’s name and prescription details, along with the 
prescribing physician and pharmacist information.30 Prior to 
 
23. § 21-28-3.32(a). The summary of the bill that created the PDMP 
stated: “This act would require the director of the department of health, after 
appropriate notice and hearing, to promulgate rules and regulations for the 
purpose of adopting a system for electronic data transmission of prescriptions 
for controlled substances.” H.B. 5756, 2013 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2013). 
24. See Miles D. Schreiner, A Deadly Combination: The Legal Response 
to America’s Prescription Drug Epidemic, 33 J. LEGAL MED. 529, 535 (2012). 
25. §§ 21-28-3.18(n), -3.32(l). 
26. Id. § 21-28-3.20(b). “The prescription-monitoring program shall be 
reviewed prior to starting any opioid.” Id. 
27. See David F. Baehren et al., A Statewide Prescription Monitoring 
Program Affects Emergency Department Prescribing Behaviors, 56 ANNALS OF 
EMERGENCY MED. 19, 21–22 (2010). 
28. Id. at 21. 
29. Id. 
30. § 21-28-3.32(b); see also R.I. DEP’T HEALTH, DATA SUBMISSION 
DISPENSE GUIDE RHODE ISLAND PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAM (RI 
PDMP) 24–25, 31 (2016), http://go.appriss.com/rs/768-UPQ-075/images/ 
RI%20PDMP%20AWARxE%20Dispenser%20Guide.pdf [hereinafter RIDOH 
DATA SUBMISSION DISPENSE GUIDE] (specifying the information required by 
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2017, access to this information was limited to certain medical 
professionals, medical boards, and pharmacists to assist in the 
treatment of their patients, in addition to law enforcement 
officials “[p]ursuant to a valid search warrant based on probable 
cause to believe a violation of federal or state criminal law ha[d] 
occurred and that specified information contained in the database 
would assist in the investigation of the crime.”31 
All fifty states have some version of a PDMP to monitor the 
prescribing and dispensing of opioids. According to the United 
States Supreme Court, the collection of prescription information  
in prescription databases is a reasonable exercise of a state’s 
broad police powers and does not violate the United States 
Constitution; however, the Court has not yet spoken to whether a 
valid search warrant is required for state law enforcement officials 
to search the database.32 
B. The 2017 Rhode Island Law Allowing Law Enforcement 
Access to Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Information 
Without a Warrant 
In 2017, Rhode Island passed a law allowing law enforcement 
to access the state’s PDMP without a warrant.33 Specifically, the 
2017 Rhode Island law allows for disclosure of PDMP information 
“[b]y a [RIDOH] employee to a certified law enforcement 
prescription drug diversion investigator of a qualified law 
enforcement agency for use in an investigation.”34 More 
 
Rhode Island when submitting records to the RI PDMP). 
31. § 21-28-3.32(a). 
32. See Whalen  v.  Roe,  429  U.S.  589,  598,  602  (1977)  (“Requiring  
such disclosures to representatives of the State having responsibility for the 
health of the community, does not automatically amount to an impermissible 
invasion of privacy.”). 
33. See S.B. 0656aaa, 2017 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2017). 
34. § 21-28-3.32; see also id. § 21-28-1.02(5) (“‘Certified law enforcement 
prescription drug diversion investigator’ means a certified law enforcement 
officer assigned by his or her qualified law enforcement agency to investigate 
prescription drug diversion.”); § 21-28-1.02(41) (“‘Qualified law enforcement 
agency’ means the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Drug Enforcement 
Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Inspector General 
of the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, or the Medicaid Fraud 
and Patient Abuse Unit in the Office of the Attorney General.”); Katherine 
Gregg, Advocates urge veto of bill to open prescription drug database for law 
enforcement, PROVIDENCE J. (July 17, 2017), http://www.providence 
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specifically, warrantless access is limited to certified law 
enforcement officials, including those “within the Medicaid Fraud 
and Patient Abuse Unit [MFPAU] in the Office of the [Rhode 
Island] Attorney General.”35 The RIAG argued that the warrant 
requirement under the 2014 law significantly handicapped its 
investigative abilities regarding illicit opioid use, and therefore, 
the 2017 Rhode Island law was necessary to further the state’s 
fight against the opioid epidemic.36 
Notably, the 2017 Rhode Island law does not provide 
unfettered access to Rhode Islanders’ prescription information.37 
As a prerequisite, the law enforcement officials within MFPAU 
must first complete a certification course approved by the state.38 
Then, when PDMP information is sought, certified law 
enforcement officials are required to submit a written verification 
to the RIDOH, averring that the PDMP information sought is in 
furtherance of an active investigation.39 Additionally, the RIAG is 
required to submit “quarterly reports of the data received by all 
certified law enforcement prescription drug diversion  
investigators in the qualified law enforcement agency,” containing 
 
journal.com/news/20170717/advocates-urge-veto-of-bill-to-open-prescription- 
drug-database-for-law-enforcement (“The access would apply to the . . . 
Medicaid Fraud and Patient Abuse Unit in the state attorney general’s 
office.”). 
35. § 21-28-1.02(41). 
The Medicaid Fraud and Patient Abuse Unit enforces the laws 
pertaining to fraud in the state Medicaid program and prosecutes 
cases of abuse, neglect or mistreatment of patients in all state 
healthcare facilities. The Unit prosecutes criminal activity, pursues 
civil remedies where appropriate and participates with federal and 
state authorities in a variety of inter-agency investigations and 
administrative     proceedings. Unit prosecutors, auditors, 
investigators and health care professionals employ a multi- 
disciplinary approach to combat health care fraud and patient abuse. 
Medicaid Fraud and Patient Abuse Unit, R.I. OFF. ATT’Y GEN., 
http://www.riag.ri.gov/CriminalUnit/MedicaidFraudPatientAbuseUnit.php 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2018). 
36. See An Act Relating to Food and Drugs — Uniform Controlled 
Substances Act: Hearing on S. 656 Before the S. Comm. on Jud., 2017 Leg. 
Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2017). 
37. “No person shall access information in the prescription-monitoring- 
database except to the extent and for the purposes authorized.” § 21-28- 
3.32(i). 
38. See id. § 21-28-1.02(5). 
39. Id. § 21-28-3.32(a)(5)(ii)(A). 
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written verification that the requests were part of lawful 
investigations, and a brief description of each case closed during 
that quarter that used PDMP information.40 If the requirements 
set forth in the law are not satisfied, the RIDOH can strip access 
to PDMP records from state law enforcement officials.41 
C. The 2017 Rhode Island Law Does Not Violate the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act or the Rhode Island 
Constitution 
The 2017 Rhode Island law is consistent with the Federal 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and 
the Rhode Island Constitution. Opponents of laws permitting 
warrantless searches of prescription records argue that the laws 
violate HIPAA privacy protections.42 This concern was raised 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding the 2017 Rhode 
Island law, where one opponent argued that prescription records 
are “some of the most highly protected information that a person 
can have.”43 While this argument may seem compelling at first 
glance, warrantless searches of the PDMP do not fall within the 
scope of HIPAA protections, which will be discussed in the 
 
 
40. Id. § 21-28-3.32(a)(5)(ii). 
41. Id. § 21-28-3.32(a)(5)(v). This section reads as follows: 
Failure to submit a verification form under subsection (5)(iv) of this 
section shall result in the immediate suspension of disclosure of 
information from the database by the department to the qualified 
law enforcement agency and its certified law enforcement 
prescription drug diversion investigators until determination is 
made by the department to allow continued disclosure. 
Id. 
42. Nathan Freed Wessler, The DEA Thinks You Have “No 
Constitutionally Protected Privacy Interest” in Your Confidential Prescription 
Records, AM. C.L. UNION (Sept. 24, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national- 
security/dea-thinks-you-have-no-constitutionally-protected-privacy-interest- 
your (“The Drug Enforcement Administration thinks people have ‘no 
constitutionally protected privacy interest’ in their confidential prescription 
records,   according   to   a brief filed   last   month   in federal  court. That 
disconcerting statement comes in response to an ACLU lawsuit challenging 
the DEA’s practice of obtaining private medical information without a 
warrant. The ACLU has just filed its response brief, explaining to the court 
why the DEA’s position is both startling and wrong.”). 
43. See An Act Relating to Food and Drugs — Uniform Controlled 
Substances Act: Hearing on S. 656 Before the S. Comm. on Jud., 2017 Leg. 
Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2017) (statement of Patrick Quinlan). 
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following section. 
Moreover, it is well established that states can afford greater 
protections under state constitutions than those provided by the 
United States Constitution.44 However, the Rhode  Island 
Supreme Court has declined to extend protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures beyond Fourth Amendment 
precedent established by the United States Supreme Court.45 
1. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
HIPAA contains a Privacy Rule that establishes national 
standards to protect individuals’ medical records and other 
protected health information.46 The Privacy Rule applies to the 
use and disclosure of private health information by “covered 
entities” and “business associates.”47 Although prescription 
information may emanate from covered entities, a PDMP is 
neither a “covered entity” nor a “business associate” within the 
meaning of HIPAA, and, thus, warrantless access to the PDMP 
does not fall within the scope of HIPAA protections.48 Regardless, 
the Privacy Rule permits covered entities to disclose protected 
health information, such as prescription records, to law 
enforcement without the individual’s written authorization upon 
submission of a written request by law enforcement.49  As  a 
result, the 2017 Rhode Island law is not inconsistent with HIPAA 
 
44. See, e.g., State v. Bjerke, 697 A.2d 1069, 1073 (R.I. 1997). 
45. See id. 
46. The HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/index.html (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2018). 
47. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2017). HIPAA defines covered entities as health 
care providers, health plans (health insurers and HMOs), and health care 
clearinghouses. Id. Health care providers include hospitals, physicians, and 
other caregivers, as well as researchers who provide health care and receive, 
access, or generate individually identifiable health care information. Id. 
Pharmacists and pharmacies are also HIPAA covered entities. Id.  A  
business associate is any person or organization that creates, receives, 
maintains or transmits protected health information on behalf of a covered 
entity. Id. 
48. NAT’L ALL. FOR MODEL STATE DRUG LAWS & SARA L. GREEN & 
ASSOCIATES, LLC, PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAMS (PMPS) AND 
THE HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT (HIPAA), 1–3 
(Mar. 31, 2017), http://www.namsdl.org/library/ED56718E-A683-22AA- 
FDEE3CD77BE925DE/. 
49. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(C) (2017). 
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because it does not fall within the scope of the Act. 
2. Rhode Island Constitution 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has recognized its power to 
afford greater protections to its citizens under the Rhode Island 
Constitution.50 It held in State v. Bjerke, however, that “[t]he 
decision to depart from minimum standards and to increase the 
level of protection should be made guardedly and should be 
supported by a principled rationale.”51 The Rhode Island 
Constitution does not provide additional protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures than those guaranteed under 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.52 
Ultimately, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has concluded that 
“the Fourth Amendment provides ample protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, and state courts should 
respect the manner in which it is interpreted by the United States 
Supreme Court.”53 As such, the proceeding section will focus on 
issues arising under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution pertaining to the 2017 Rhode Island law. 
II. THE 2017 RHODE ISLAND LAW AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
The 2017 Rhode Island law raises constitutional issues. For 
example, when law enforcement officials access PDMP 
information pursuant to the 2017 Rhode Island law for the 
purpose of investigating a prescriber or pharmacist for illicit 
activity, patients who received treatment from that prescriber or 
pharmacist inevitably will have their prescription information 
turned over to law enforcement as well.54 Therefore, physicians’ 
constitutional privacy right in the records they keep and patients’ 
 
 
50. State v. Bjerke, 697 A.2d 1069, 1073 (R.I. 1997) (quoting State v. 
Benoit, 417 A.2d 895, 899 (R.I. 1980)) (internal quotations omitted). 
51. Id. 
52. See id. The Rhode Island Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, papers and possessions, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.” R.I. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
53. State v. Werner, 615 A.2d 1010, 1014 (R.I. 1992); see also Bjerke, 697 
A.2d at 1073 (stating that the court recognizes its power to afford greater 
protections under the R.I. Constitution, but declined to do so). 
54. 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-3.32 (Supp. 2017). 
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constitutional privacy right in their prescription information are 
potentially violated by the 2017 Rhode Island law. This part 
argues that the 2017 Rhode Island law does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. First, patients do 
not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in their prescription 
information contained in the PDMP; and second, as to prescribing 
physicians and pharmacists, warrantless searches by law 
enforcement of prescription records reported to the PDMP fall into 
the administrative search exception to the warrant requirement. 
Constitutional implications that may arise differ for patients 
and prescribing physicians. Although patients do not own the 
records reported to the PDMP, they could have a right to privacy 
under the Fourth Amendment if those patients retain a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their prescription 
information.55 If the patients do not have a reasonable  
expectation of privacy in their prescription information contained 
in the PDMP, then Fourth Amendment protections do not apply, 
and law enforcement officials do not have to obtain a warrant to 
access the database.56 On the other hand, in Rhode Island, all 
medical records are the property of the physician who created the 
medical records.57 As such, medical records reported to the PDMP 
are commercial property of the reporting physicians, which is 
covered by the Fourth Amendment unless an exception to the 
warrant requirement applies––such as the administrative search 
exception that arguably applies here.58 
A. Patients Do Not Retain a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in 
Prescription Information Reported to the PDMP 
Assume that a patient in Rhode Island has been charged with 
 
 
55. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“[T]he Fourth 
Amendment protects people––and not simply ‘areas’––against unreasonable 
searches and seizures . . . .”). 
56. Id. 
57. § 5-37-22(g) (“Unless otherwise expressly stated in writing by the 
medical practice group, all medical records shall be the property of the 
medical practice group with which a physician is associated when that 
physician created all such medical records.”). 
58. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 354; see also New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 
699 (1987) (stating that the protection against unreasonable searches or 
seizures extends to commercial property). 
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a criminal offense stemming from evidence obtained through a 
warrantless search of his or her prescription information 
contained in the PDMP. Subsequently, the patient challenges the 
constitutionality of the 2017 Rhode Island law that authorized law 
enforcement officials to obtain that information without a 
warrant––a scenario that may be a reality in the not-so-distant 
future. In order to prevail, the patient would have to prove that  
he or she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her 
prescription information contained in the PDMP.59 To make that 
determination, the United States Supreme Court employs a two- 
prong test: first, whether the individual has exhibited a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the object of the search; and secondly, 
whether that subjective expectation of privacy is one that society 
is prepared to recognize as reasonable.60 If a reasonable 
expectation of privacy does not exist, then the Fourth Amendment 
protections do not apply and warrantless searches are allowed.61 
The last time the United States Supreme Court interpreted 
the right to privacy in prescription information was in Whalen v. 
Roe, in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of a New 
York law that required patients’ prescription information to be 
reported to a centralized database.62 The Court admitted that, as 
a starting point, a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
prescription information exists.63 Specifically, two different kinds 
 
59. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
60. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986); Smith v. Maryland, 
442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). In 
Smith, regarding the first prong, the Court stated that the inquiry rests on, 
“whether . . . the individual has shown that ‘he seeks to preserve [something] 
as private.’” 442 U.S. at 740 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361) (alteration in 
original). In addition, regarding the second prong, the Smith Court stated 
that the determination turns on whether the individual’s expectation, viewed 
objectively, is justifiable under the circumstances. Id. 
61. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (“[T]his Court uniformly has held that 
application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person 
invoking its protection can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate 
expectation of privacy’ that has been invaded by government action.”); see 
also Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357) 
(“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by 
a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment––subject only to a few specifically established and well- 
delineated exceptions.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
62. 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977). 
63. Id. at 599–600. 
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of privacy interests are implicated by a state-run prescription 
database: “One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of 
personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in 
making certain kinds of important decisions.”64 In upholding the 
constitutionality of the law, the Court stated: 
[N]either the immediate nor the threatened impact of the 
patient-identification requirements in the New York 
State Controlled Substances Act of 1972 on either the 
reputation or the independence of patients for whom 
Schedule II drugs are medically indicated is sufficient to 
constitute an invasion of any right or liberty protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment.65 
The Court reasoned that requiring prescription information to be 
provided to government officials who are responsible for public 
health and safety, “does not automatically amount to an 
impermissible invasion of privacy.”66 
Courts have differed as to the extent of patients’ limited 
privacy interest recognized in Whalen.67 Although Whalen upheld 
the constitutionality of state-run PDMPs, the Court did not 
address patients’ reasonable expectation of privacy pertaining 
warrantless searches by law enforcement officials.68 Nonetheless, 
since patients do not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
prescription information that is reported to the PDMP, one may 
argue that the warrant requirement is never triggered and, 
therefore, a warrantless search would not result in a Fourth 
Amendment violation. In contrast, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Douglas v. Dobbs, found that 
 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 603–04. 
66. Id. at 602. 
67. See Kathleen A. Ward, A Dose of Reality: The Prescription for a 
Limited Constitutional Right to Privacy in Pharaceutical Records is 
Examined in Douglas v. Dobbs, 12 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 73, 76 (2008) 
(“Although courts have acknowledged a privacy right exists in 
pharmaceutical records, the magnitude of this right has not been completely 
defined.”). 
68. “The constitutional question presented is whether the State of New 
York may record, in a centralized computer file, the names and addresses of 
all persons who have obtained, pursuant to a doctor’s prescription, certain 
drugs for which there is both a lawful and unlawful market.” Whalen, 429 
U.S. at 591. 
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patients do retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
prescription records.69 The court, relying on the privacy interests 
recognized in Whalen, concluded that a patient’s interest in 
avoiding disclosure included law enforcement officials and not 
merely disclosure to the general public because prescription 
records may contain information regarding other medical 
conditions.70 
State courts that have interpreted Whalen have found that a 
patient’s reasonable expectation of privacy extends to protection 
against public disclosure, but it does not extend to prescription 
information obtained by law enforcement officials.71 For example, 
the Connecticut Supreme Court has held that patients do not have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in prescription information 
obtained by law enforcement.72 In State v. Russo,  law  
enforcement officers, obtained a patient’s prescription records 
without a warrant pursuant to state law.73 The court reasoned 
that the privacy protection recognized in Whalen was only an 
expectation that a patient’s prescription records will not be 
disseminated to the general public.74 Moreover, it stated that “the 
[Whalen] court drew no distinction between the patients’ rights 
vis-à-vis the investigators, on the one hand, and the patients’ 
rights vis-a-vis the regulatory personnel of the New York 
department of health, on the other hand.”75 Thus, the Russo court 
extended Whalen from mere reporting of a patient’s information to 
a database to warrantless searches by law enforcement officers.76 
 
69. 419 F.3d 1097, 1102 (10th Cir. 2005). 
70. Id. 
71. See, e.g., State v. Wiedeman, 835 N.W.2d 698 (Neb. 2013); State v. 
Russo, 790 A.2d 1132 (Conn. 2002); State v. Stow, 593 N.E.2d 294 (Ohio 
1992). 
72. Russo, 790 A.2d at 1152–53. 
73. Id. at 1141–42 (“General Statutes § 21a-265 broadly provides that 
prescription records shall be ‘open for inspection . . . to federal, state, county 
and municipal officers, whose duty it is to enforce the [federal and state drug 
laws].’”) (alterations in original). 
74. See id. at 1143. 
75. Id. at 1153. 
76. In response to the patient’s argument that although an individual 
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to his or her 
prescription records in the context of searches by regulatory personnel, an 
individual does have such an expectation of privacy in the context of 
inspections by law enforcement personnel, the court stated: “Both the dictates 
of Whalen and common sense compel this court to reject the defendant’s claim 
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Similarly, in State v. Stow, the Ohio Supreme Court found that a 
patient’s right to privacy in prescription records extends only to 
disclosure of information to the general public.77 The court held 
that the mere threat of unauthorized disclosure to the general 
public was not enough to render a law permitting warrantless 
searches unconstitutional.78 Moreover, the Nebraska Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of a warrantless search by law 
enforcement because the request was safeguarded by any further 
dissemination of those records.79 
Turning now to the 2017 Rhode Island law, the weight of the 
case law suggests that patients do not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their prescription information contained 
in Rhode Island’s PDMP. The 2017 Rhode Island law does not 
follow the Douglas line of reasoning, which states that patients 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in prescription records 
because they are inherently private and might contain facts about 
other medical conditions.80 The Douglas court expressly stated 
that a patient has a right to privacy in preventing disclosure of 
prescription records by government officials but failed to 
acknowledge the fact that police officers are also government 
officials.81 Befittingly, the court failed to address whether the 
prescription records at issue in the case actually contained such 
information, only finding that “prescription records . . . may reveal 
other facts about what illnesses a person has . . . .”82 Regardless, 
prescription information reported to the Rhode Island PDMP does 
not include facts pertaining to a patient’s medical conditions: it 
contains only the patient’s basic information and prescription 
 
that any such distinction is constitutionally significant.” Id. at 1153. 
77. 593 N.E.2d 294, 299 (Ohio 1992) (“After finding that no significant 
threat is presented to [the patient’s] right of privacy, we follow the lead of the 
Whalen court.”). 
78. Id. 
79. State v. Wiedeman, 835 N.W.2d 698, 709 (Neb. 2013). “Weighing the 
State’s significant interest in the regulation of potentially dangerous and 
addictive narcotic drugs against the minimal interference with one’s ability to 
make medical decisions and the protections from broader dissemination to 
the general public, we find the State did not violate [the patient’s] . . . privacy 
rights through its warrantless, investigatory access to [the patient’s] 
prescription records.” Id. at 206. 
80. Douglas v. Dobbs, 419 F.3d 1097, 1102 (10th Cir. 2005). 
81. See id. 
82. Id. (emphasis added). 
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information.83 
The 2017 Rhode Island law is similarly consistent with the 
interpretation of a patient’s right to privacy delineated in 
Whalen.84 As previously stated, the 2017 Rhode Island law 
adequately safeguards against disclosure of prescription 
information to the general public by allowing only the MFPAU–– 
responsible for public health and safety––to obtain PDMP records 
upon submission of written verification to the  RIDOH.85  The 
2017 Rhode Island law expressly prohibits disclosure of PDMP 
information to unauthorized personnel and vests the RIDOH with 
the ability to strip access to PDMP information upon non- 
compliance with the law, adequately safeguarding against the 
possibility of disclosure.86 
Thus, because patients do not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in their prescription information contained in the 
PDMP, a warrantless search of the PDMP by law enforcement 
pursuant to the 2017 Rhode Island law would not trigger the 
warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment. 
B. Fourth Amendment Issues Pertaining to Prescribing 
Physicians and Pharmacists: The Administrative Search Exception 
to the Warrant Requirement 
Assume that a Rhode Island law enforcement official searched 
PDMP records without a warrant pursuant to an investigation  of 
a doctor, who is now charged with a criminal offense stemming 
from illegal prescribing practices. The doctor challenges the 
constitutionality of the 2017 Rhode Island law authorizing the 
officer to conduct the warrantless search, arguing that the search 
was unconstitutional because the prescription records that were 
reported to the PDMP are the commercial property of his or her 
medical practice, and therefore protected by the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Under the Fourth Amendment, “searches conducted outside 




83. See RIDOH DATA SUBMISSION DISPENSE GUIDE, supra note 30, at 25. 
84. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977). 
85. 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-3.32(a)(5)(iv) (Supp. 2017). 
86. Id. § 21-28-3.32(a)(5)(v). 
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few specifically established and well-delineated  exceptions.”87  
One of those exceptions is the administrative search exception, 
which involves those situations where the government conducts a 
search of commercial property pursuant to a regulatory scheme.88 
The Fourth Amendment extends to commercial property, but 
greater latitude is afforded to warrantless searches of commercial 
property because the privacy rights that individuals enjoy in those 
contexts differs from the privacy right to one’s home or person. 
Specifically, “that this privacy interest [in commercial property] 
may, in certain circumstances, be adequately protected by 
regulatory schemes authorizing warrantless inspections.”89 
The United States Supreme Court has not decided whether a 
search of a PDMP by law enforcement officials is an 
administrative search. Nonetheless, a search must meet three 
requirements to fall within the administrative search exception to 
the warrant requirement.90 First, the warrantless search must be 
one that is designed to enforce a regulatory scheme and not 
merely for the purpose of collecting criminal evidence.91 Second, 
the warrantless search must be in the context of a “pervasively 
regulated industry.”92 Finally, the warrantless search must be 
reasonable.93 Reasonableness is determined using a three-part 
test: (1) the regulatory scheme must further a “substantial” 
government interest; (2) warrantless inspections must be 
necessary to further the regulatory scheme; and (3) the regulatory 
scheme must be a constitutionally adequate substitute for a 
warrant.94 
 
87. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). 
88. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987); Ann K. Wooster, 
Annotation, Validity of Warrantless Administrative Inspection of Business 
that is Allegedly Closely or Pervasively Regulated, 182 A.L.R. Fed. § 2[a] 
(2002); see also Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative 
Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 259 (2011) (“[T]he government has 
increasingly relied on administrative search doctrine to justify its actions.”). 
89. Wooster, supra note 88, at § 2[a]; see Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., 436 
U.S. 307, 312–13 (1978). 
90. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 702–05. 
91. Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015) (quoting 
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000)). 
92. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
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1. A Warrantless Search Authorized Under the 2017 Rhode 
Island Law is Designed to Enforce an Administrative Scheme 
To determine if a warrantless search falls into the 
administrative search exception to the warrant requirement, the 
first step is to conclude whether the warrantless search is 
designed to enforce a regulatory scheme and not solely for the 
purpose of collecting criminal evidence.95 The United States 
Supreme Court in Los Angeles v. Patel considered whether 
warrantless searches of hotel records by law enforcement officers 
was an administrative search.96 The contested code provision 
compelled hotel operators to keep a record containing specific 
information concerning guests, and to make the record available  
to police for inspection on demand.97 The Court found that, 
although the exception to the warrant requirement did not 
ultimately apply, the authorized warrantless search was an 
administrative search because it served a “special need” other 
than conducting criminal investigations.98 The special need was  
to ensure compliance with the recordkeeping requirement, “which 
in turn deters criminals from operating on the hotels’ premises.”99 
Furthermore, in New York v. Burger, the United States Supreme 
Court held that a warrantless search of a junkyard by a police 
officer was constitutional.100 The Court concluded that an 
administrative search pursuant to a regulatory scheme is not 
unconstitutional “simply because, in the course of enforcing it, an 
inspecting officer may discover evidence of crimes . . . .”101 Thus,  
it is clear that a warrantless search may be conducted by law 
enforcement personnel for both administrative and penal purposes 
and still fall within the meaning of an administrative search.102 
The Vermont Supreme Court relied on Burger in finding that 
 
95. Id. 
96. 135 S. Ct. at 2448. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 2452. 
99. Id. The code provision was struck down on other grounds because it 
failed to provide hotel operators with an opportunity for pre-compliance 
review. Id. at 2451. 
100. 482 U.S. 691, 717 (1987). 
101. Id. at 716. 
102. See id. at 717 (“[W]e fail to see any constitutional significance in the 
fact that police officers, rather than ‘administrative’ agents, are permitted to 
conduct the . . . inspection.”). 
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a warrantless search of pharmacy records by a police officer was 
an administrative search.103 In that case, State v. Welch,  the 
police officer acted pursuant to a Vermont law that required 
pertinent records to be open to state law enforcement officials who 
were responsible for enforcing narcotics laws.104 The court held 
that the police officer’s inspection was within his enforcement 
powers, which allowed him to search the pharmacy records in 
furtherance of a criminal investigation.105 
Under the 2017 Rhode Island law, warrantless searches of the 
PDMP serve as an additional piece to the well-established and 
long-standing regulatory scheme of prescription drug regulation 
and reporting in the state.106 The PDMP fosters communication 
among health professionals in order to better treat their patients 
and provides prescribers with information that is conducive to 
making informed prescribing decisions.107 Beyond that, the  
PDMP is a tool used by law enforcement to detect illegal activities 
by physicians, pharmacists, and patients.108 Therefore, the 2017 
Rhode Island law is consistent with the Burger line of reasoning 
because it serves administrative and penal purposes.109 
2. The Prescription Drug Industry in Rhode Island is Pervasively 
Regulated 
Regarding the administrative search exception, the United 
States Supreme Court employs a two-part test to determine if an 
industry has a reasonable expectation of privacy: (1) the industry 
must be comprehensively regulated; and (2) the industry must 
pose an inherently clear and significant risk to public welfare.110 
 
 
103. State v. Welch, 624 A.2d 1105, 1110 (Vt. 1992). 
104. Id. at 1111. 
105. Id. at 1113. 
106. See 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-3.32 (Supp. 2017). 
107. See id. § 21-28-3.32(m). The prescribing practitioner shall review the 
prescription-monitoring program prior to refilling or initiating an opioid. See 
id. § 21-28-3.32(m); Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, supra note 7. 
108. See Press Release, Governor Gina Raimondo, RI Achieves 100% 
Enrollment in Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (Sept. 29, 2016), 
http://www.ri.gov/press/view/28654. 
109. See § 21-28-3.32(a)(1)–(2), (5). 
110. Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2454 (2005). However, the 
United States Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that the 
administrative search exception is inapplicable to a warrantless search that 
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Based on the nature of pervasively regulated industries, an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the context of 
those industries is lessened.111 Because of that, the United States 
Supreme Court has stated that “no reasonable expectation of 
privacy . . . could exist for a proprietor over the stock of such an 
enterprise.”112 
Despite numerous lower court decisions, the United States 
Supreme Court has yet to decide whether the prescription drug 
industry is pervasively regulated for purposes of the 
administrative search exception to the warrant requirement.113 
Regarding industries other than the prescription drug industry, 
the Court characterized pervasively regulated industries as those 
with such a history of comprehensive government regulation that 
a reasonable expectation of privacy could not exist for a proprietor 
over information produced and maintained within the context of 
that industry.114 
Lower courts have held that the pharmaceutical industry is 
comprehensively regulated for purposes of the administrative 
search exception.115 Notably, in United States v. Gonsalves, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit analyzed 
whether the prescription drug industry in Rhode Island is 
 
 
is not within the context of a pervasively regulated industry. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. United States v. Jamieson-McKames Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 651 F.2d 
532, 542 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that the drug-manufacturing industry, 
which had a long history of supervision and inspection, was within the class 
of closely regulated businesses that could be searched without a warrant 
without violating the Fourth Amendment); U.S. ex. Rel. Terraciano v. 
Montanye, 493 F.2d 682, 685 (2nd Cir. 1974) (holding that searching a 
licensed pharmacist’s records related to narcotics and stimulant or 
depressant drugs that were maintained on the premises did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment); see also Costantini v. Medical Bd. of Cal., No. 93–16926, 
1994 WL 419924, at *2 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 1994) (unpublished table decision) 
(holding that a search of pharmaceutical and patient records of a principal 
officer of a weight-loss clinic fell within the administrative search exception 
to the Fourth Amendment). 
114. Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2454 (quoting Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 
307, 313 (1978)). 
115. United States v. Gonsalves, 435 F.3d 64, 67 (1st Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Acklen, 690 F.2d 70, 75 (6th Cir. 1982); United States D.O.J. v. 
Utah Dep’t of Com., No. 2:16-cv-611-DN-DBP, 2017 WL 3189868, at *1, *9 (D. 
Utah Jul. 27, 2017). 
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pervasively regulated.116 In Gonsalves, pursuant to a search 
warrant, law enforcement officers conducted a search of patient 
prescription records located in a doctor’s office.117 The court held 
that: 
In Rhode Island, as under federal law and in other states, 
drugs are heavily regulated in storage and dispensation 
and have been for many years. . . . Rhode Island’s Food, 
Drugs, and Cosmetics Act has been in effect for a half- 
century . . . and the pertinent provisions are numerous, 
longstanding and pervasive. The scheme readily passes 
the “closely regulated” test of Burger.118 
Since Gonsalves, Rhode Island has continued to regulate the 
prescription drug industry, passing numerous laws pertaining to 
the PDMP since it was established in 2014.119 For example, since 
2016, prescribers have been required to inform patients of the 
existence of the PDMP, and are required to report prescription 
information to the PDMP within one business day.120 
In addition to being comprehensively regulated, the 
prescription drug industry in Rhode Island must pose a significant 
risk to the public welfare in order to qualify for the administrative 
exception.121 In Patel, the United States Supreme Court held that 
the hotel industry was not pervasively regulated because “nothing 
inherent in the operation of hotels poses a clear and significant 
risk to the public welfare.”122 Such a statement, however, cannot 
be made in regard to prescription opioids. The prescription drug 
industry, unlike hotels, is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of pervasively regulated industries because it poses 
a clear and significant risk to public welfare, illustrated by the 
numerous laws passed by Rhode Island in response to the opioid 
crisis.123 
 
116. Gonsalves, 435 F.3d at 67. 
117. Id. at 66. 
118. Id. at 67 (internal citations omitted). 
119. See H.R. 7574, 2014 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2014); S.B. 2523, 2014  
Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2014); S.B. 2823, 2016 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2016); S.B 
2946, 2016 Sess. (R.I. 2016); H.R. 5469, 2017 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2017). 
120. S.B. 2823, 2016 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2016). 
121. See Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2454 (2015). 
122. Id. 
123. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
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Therefore, the 2017 Rhode Island law satisfies the two-part 
test for pervasively regulated industries because the prescription 
drug industry in Rhode Island is comprehensively regulated and 
poses a clear and significant risk to public welfare. 
3. Warrantless Searches by Law Enforcement of the PDMP 
Under the 2017 Rhode Island Law are Reasonable 
An administrative search within a pervasively regulated 
industry must be reasonable under the three Burger 
requirements.124 The test for reasonableness differs  from  the 
Katz two-prong test because an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy is significantly lessened in the context of a 
pervasively regulated industry.125 In the context  of 
administrative searches: (1)the regulatory scheme must further a 
“substantial” government interest; (2) warrantless inspections 
must be “necessary to further the regulatory scheme”; and (3) the 
“inspection program, in terms of certainty and regularity of its 
application,” is a “constitutionally adequate substitute for a 
warrant.”126 Although the United States Supreme Court has not 
analyzed the constitutionality of warrantless searches of PDMPs, 
numerous state courts have applied the three-part  Burger 
analysis to laws similar to that of the 2017 Rhode Island law.127 
a. The PDMP is a Regulatory Scheme that Furthers a 
Substantial Government Interest 
Courts have recognized that the government has a substantial 
interest in regulating areas that pose a threat to public welfare.128 
 
prescription opioid abuse is a health epidemic. Joanna Shepherd, Combating 
the Prescription Painkiller Epidemic: A National Prescription Drug Reporting 
Program, 40 AM. J. L. & MED. 85, 86 (2014); see also Overdose Death Data, 
supra note 4. 
124. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987); see also State v. 
Welch, 624 A.2d 1105, 1111 (R.I. 1992). 
125. See Welch, 624 A.2d at 1111. 
126. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702 (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 
600, 602 (1981)). 
127. See, e.g., State v. Russo, 790 A.2d 1132 (Conn. 2002); State v. Stow, 
593 N.E.2d 294 (Ohio 1992); State v. Welch, 624 A.2d 1105 (Vt. 1992). 
128. States such as Vermont, Connecticut, and Ohio have all recognized a 
strong government interest in the regulation of prescription drugs.  See 
Russo, 790 A.2d at 1155; Stow, 593, N.E.2d at 300; Welch, 624 A.2d at 1111. 
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For example, in Burger, the United States Supreme Court found 
that New York had a substantial government interest in 
regulating the junkyard industry because the high rate of motor 
vehicle thefts were causing a significant economic burden on 
citizens.129 Additionally, regarding warrantless searches  of 
mining facilities, the Court stated: “[I]t is undisputed that there is 
a substantial [government] interest in improving the health and 
safety conditions in the Nation’s underground and surface mines 
. . . the mining industry is among the most hazardous in the 
country . . . .”130 
The PDMP furthers a substantial government interest in 
regulating opioids because the over-prescribing of opioids, which 
often leads to overdose deaths, can be addressed by regulating and 
controlling the prescription drug industry through the PDMP. 
Beyond crime, Rhode Island’s opioid problem negatively affects its 
citizens at an increasing rate, and the medical and prescription 
drug industries are directly associated with this problem.131 The 
2017 Rhode Island law ensures that all prescribing physicians and 
dispensing pharmacists make informed decisions while treating 
their patients because, under its requirements, physicians and 
pharmacists must consult the PDMP prior to prescribing an 
opioid.132 Absent the PDMP, it would be significantly more 
difficult to prosecute over-prescribing doctors, “pill-mill” 
pharmacies, and opioid-abusing patients. The PDMP allows 
government officials to monitor state-wide opioid use and track 
down bad actors. Therefore, it is difficult to deny that Rhode 
Island’s PDMP law furthers an important governmental interest 
in combatting the opioid crisis in the state. 
b. Warrantless Searches of Rhode Island’s PDMP Are Necessary 
to Further the Regulatory Scheme 
Turning to the second Burger requirement, warrantless 
 
129. Burger, 482 U.S. at 708. 
130. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 602; see also United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 
311, 315 (1972) (concluding regulation of firearms to prevent crime furthered 
a substantial government interest). 
131. C.f. Burger, 482 U.S. at 708 (concluding that the high rate of vehicle 
theft in New York was a major societal problem that placed enormous 
economic and personal burdens on its citizens). 
132. 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-3.32(m) (Supp. 2017). 
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searches must be necessary to further the regulatory scheme.133  
In this context, the United States Supreme Court has often 
deferred to determinations made by the legislature. For example, 
in Donovan, the Court deferred to the legislature’s decision to 
authorize warrantless searches of mining facilities, stating: “[I]f 
an inspection is to be effective and serve as a credible deterrent, 
unannounced, even frequent inspections are essential. In this 
context, the prerequisite of a warrant could easily frustrate 
inspection.”134 Likewise, the Vermont Supreme Court deferred to 
the legislature’s determination that warrantless searches are 
necessary to effectuate the deterrent effect of prescription drug 
regulations.135 
Looking to the 2017 Rhode Island law, the Rhode Island 
General Assembly determined that it was necessary to discard the 
warrant requirement for PDMP searches. The RIAG expressly 
stated that warrantless searches are necessary to further the 
effectiveness of the PDMP.136 The RIAG further stated a warrant 
requirement significantly hampers its ability to investigate “pill- 
mills” and doctor-shopping patients.137 On the other side, 
representatives from the ACLU and various medical associates 
testified in strong opposition to the then-proposed law before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee.138 The Rhode Island General 
Assembly had ample evidence to make an informed decision 
regarding warrantless access by law enforcement to PDMP 
information. Thus, a court deferring to the legislature would find 
that a law authorizing warrantless searches of Rhode Island’s 
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c. The PDMP Regulatory Scheme is a Constitutionally Adequate 
Substitute for a Warrant 
Under the third Burger requirement, in order to be considered 
a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant, the law must 
perform the two basic functions of a warrant: (1) it must advise 
the owner that the search is being made pursuant to the law and 
has a properly defined scope; and (2) it must limit the discretion of 
the inspecting officers and have a properly defined scope.139 
Regarding the first prong, the Vermont Supreme Court in 
Stow stated, “the inspection scheme provides an adequate 
substitute for a warrant, because these provisions are ‘sufficiently 
comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property 
cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to 
periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes.’”140 Under 
the 2017 Rhode Island law, prescribers are sufficiently notified 
that a search is being made in accordance with the law because all 
prescribers in Rhode Island are required to register with the 
PDMP in order to obtain a prescribing license.141 Moreover, the 
bottom of the PDMP registration form has a separate section 
pertaining to the PDMP’s functions and requirements.142 Thus, 
prescribing physicians and pharmacists have knowledge of their 
record-keeping obligations and are aware that inspections of 
prescription records in the PDMP may occur. 
In addition, the scope of the Rhode Island law is narrowly 
tailored––only authorizing the MFPAU to conduct warrantless 
searches of the PDMP upon submission of a written request to the 
RIDOH.143 The United States Supreme Court in  Patel  
determined that a municipal ordinance allowing warrantless 
searches of hotel records was too broad because it failed 
“sufficiently to constrain police officers’ discretion as to which 
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overdose crisis are actively using the system to keep their patients safe.”  
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hotels to search and under what circumstances.”144 On the other 
hand, the court in Welch found that a regulatory scheme 
authorizing warrantless searches was narrowly tailored because it 
limited warrantless inspections to certain law enforcement 
officers.145 Therefore, the 2017 Rhode Island law is  consistent 
with the Vermont Supreme Court’s line of reasoning. 
Furthermore, the 2017 Rhode Island law requires that the request 
for PDMP information be pursuant to an active investigation and 
does not allow unfettered access to prescription records.146 The 
time, place, and scope of the Rhode Island law is sufficiently 
limited to serve as a constitutionally adequate substitute for a 
warrant. 
In conclusion, the 2017 Rhode Island law satisfies the 
requirements of the administrative search exception delineated by 
the United States Supreme Court. As a result, warrantless 
searches of the PDMP by law enforcement do not violate the 
constitutional rights of the prescribers whose records are obtained 
pursuant to the 2017 Rhode Island law. 
CONCLUSION 
Rhode Island lawmakers are faced with an epidemic that 
continues to pose a serious risk to the welfare of the state. The 
2017 Rhode Island law strikes a balance between protecting the 
privacy of prescription information and providing law enforcement 
officials with effective tools to combat the opioid epidemic in 
Rhode Island. This Comment has shown that the privacy 
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment are not triggered 
by warrantless searches of Rhode Island’s PDMP. The  2017 
Rhode Island law will help solve the opioid crisis and will 
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